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Risk Assessment of Malicious Attacks
Against Power Systems
Ettore Bompard, Member, IEEE, Ciwei Gao, Roberto Napoli, Member, IEEE,
Angela Russo, Marcelo Masera, and Alberto Stefanini
Abstract—The new scenarios of malicious attack prompt for
their deeper consideration and mainly when critical systems are
at stake. In this framework, infrastructural systems, including
power systems, represent a possible target due to the huge impact
they can have on society. Malicious attacks are different in their
nature from other more traditional cause of threats to power
system, since they embed a strategic interaction between the
attacker and the defender (characteristics that cannot be found
in natural events or systemic failures). This difference has not
been systematically analyzed by the existent literature. In this
respect, new approaches and tools are needed. This paper presents
a mixed-strategy game-theory model able to capture the strategic
interactions between malicious agents that may be willing to attack
power systems and the system operators, with its related bodies,
that are in charge of defending them. At the game equilibrium,
the different strategies of the two players, in terms of attacking/
protecting the critical elements of the systems, can be obtained.
The information about the attack probability to various elements
can be used to assess the risk associated with each of them, and
the efficiency of defense resource allocation is evidenced in terms
of the corresponding risk. Reference defense plans related to the
online defense action and the defense action with a time delay can
be obtained according to their respective various time constraints.
Moreover, risk sensitivity to the defense/attack-resource variation
is also analyzed. The model is applied to a standard IEEE RTS-96
test system for illustrative purpose and, on the basis of that system,
some peculiar aspects of the malicious attacks are pointed out.
Index Terms—Game theory, malicious attack, mixed-strategy
equilibrium (MSE), power-system security, vulnerability.
NOMENCLATURE
Indexes and Sets:
i Index for attack plans.
j Index for defense plans.
k Index for components.
l Index for lines.
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m Index for buses.
Φ Set of the lines of the system.
Θ Set of the buses of the system.
Ai Set of components of the ith attack plan.
Dj Set of components of the jth defense plan.
G1 Set of components that have not been defended and
are destroyed.
G2 Set of components that have not been defended and
are not destroyed.
H1 Set of components that have been defended but are
destroyed.
H2 Set of components that have been defended and are
not destroyed.
R Set of components of the entire system.
X Set of components that have been destroyed.
BA Budget of the attacker.
BD Budget of the defender.
C Monetary measure of the damage incurred by the
attack action.
CA Attacker’s cost of its attacking.
CD Defender’s cost of its defending measures.
CAi Cost of implementation of Ai.
CDj Cost of implementation of Dj .
Cij Damage evaluation under the scenario with the attack
plan Ai and defense Dj .
Coak Cost of attack of the kth component.
Codk Cost of defense of the kth component.
Eij Expected costs/losses of the system under the scenario
with the attack plan Ai and defense Dj .
Fl Power flow on line l.
Flmax Maximum power flow on line l.
Gm Value of the damage at the bus m.
Lm Load demand at bus m before the contingency
occurrence.
MX Total economic value of the lost load due to the
destruction of the components of X .
NA Number of the feasible attack plans.
ND Number of the feasible defense plans.
OAk kth component in an attack plan.
Pm Generated power before the contingency at bus m.
Pmmax Maximum value of the generated power at bus m.
SA Payoff of the attacker.
SD Payoff of the defender.
SAi Attacker’s utility corresponding to Ai.
SDj Defender’s utility corresponding to Dj .
nA Number of the component candidates for the attack.
nD Number of the component candidates for the defense.
pAi Probability of choosing the ith attack plan.
pDj Probability of choosing the jth defense plan.
1083-4427/$26.00 © 2009 IEEE
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poak Probability of the kth component to be attacked.
podk Probability of the kth component to be defended.
αk Probability of the kth component to be successfully
destroyed without any defending measure.
βk Probability of the kth component to be successfully
destroyed with a defending measure.
γ Risk.
λm Evaluation factor with reference to the load shedding
at bus m.
ΔLm Load shedding at the bus m.
ΔPm Variation of the generated power at bus m.
I. INTRODUCTION
A VAST number of hazards can threaten power systemsboth due to accidental reasons and to intentional attacks;
both of them can have disastrous effects on the society from
the social and economic point of view. Potential deliberate
attacks draw more attention nowadays when threats such as
international terrorism have become a very serious issue.
Since terrorist attacks aim at having the largest impact on
society, critical infrastructures are a credible target. Therefore,
systems such as the power one, which is vital to the whole
society and whose failure can cause severe consequences, have
to be properly protected. Recent accidental blackouts have
demonstrated the vulnerability of those systems (e.g., the 2003
U.S. blackout, 9300 km2, 50 millions of inhabitants involved,
$39 billion/day of economic lost; 2003 Italy blackout, 57 mil-
lions of inhabitants, 4 persons died, 120 MC of economic loss
[1]). Authorities have already realized the threat of malicious
attacks [2] and taken several countermeasures against their
possible occurrence. For instance, for power systems, the North
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) defined for
the North American electricity sector a set of physical/cyber-
response security guidelines with the actions that they should
consider when responding to the malicious-threat-level alerts
issued by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada [3], [4].
The conventional power-system security and risk analysis
is based on the physical nature of the power system. System
failures depend on components’ reliability (transformer [5],
the specific protection system [6], etc.) and the randomly hap-
pening of natural accidents (lightning, fires, animal intrusion,
etc.). Online security-assessment approaches are developed to
examine the status of the system [7], [8].
However, research on modeling malicious attack against
power systems is at a preliminary stage. A greedy algorithm
is applied in [9] to identify promising interdiction strategies in
transmission system. A max–min model is introduced in [10],
and a more general model of bilevel formulation is proposed
in [11]. In [12], the power-system vulnerability is treated with
Bayesian networks, which is based on statistical data. Neverthe-
less, the papers mentioned above neglect the fact that both the
terrorist and the defender are intelligent, and their actions are
guided by their strategic analysis. For instance, Bier et al. [9]
study the impact of different system-hardening strategies but
only with respect to already-identified interdiction strategies. In
this respect, strategic interactions, which are not taken into ac-
count in conventional security analysis, should be emphasized
in the research on malicious attack. New approaches and tools
are indispensable to that aim.
Game theory, as an effective tool for the analysis of strategic
behavior and the formal study of conflict and cooperation
[13], has already been resorted for capturing the thoughts of
terrorists in negotiation or nonnegotiation processes [14]–[17],
to analyze how terrorist select the target country [18], and how
governments choose deterrence and preemption strategies [19].
In this paper, we present a mixed-strategy game-theory
model, which is able to capture the strategic interaction among
attacker and defender for power systems under malicious threat.
The model provides an effective way to assess the risk of
attacks against specific power-system components, so as to
support the proper allocation of resources for the protection
of the system. This paper presents the concept of the prob-
ability of components being attacked/defended, derived from
the similar “probability” conception in traditional reliability
analysis. Moreover, the method presented can calculate the risk
sensitivity of the target system to the resources of the defender
and the attacker, an attribute that helps in making optimal
defense resource allocation and shows the links between attack/
defense resources and consequence of the attack. Game-theory
application to the power system introduced in [20] takes a
relative macroperspective, namely, it focuses on resource al-
location between measures of protection and recovery, while
attacks are analyzed with reference to various scenarios in terms
of combination of normal/extreme operational situations and
different attack strategies. In this paper, resource allocation is
computed for each specific component, namely, it shares the
same objective as [21], i.e., to optimally allocate the resources
in response to a threat of malicious attack.
Of course, multiagent systems will be more effective to
simulate the real world [22], [23], but game theory is usually
more suitable to illustrate the essence of the problem.
The remainder of this paper is composed of the following
sections. In Section III, malicious and natural threats are ana-
lyzed and compared. The actions of the attacker and defender,
the interaction between the attacker and the defender, and the
technique for efficiently finding the mixed-strategy equilibrium
(MSE) are explained in Section IV. System vulnerability and
risk assessment with reference to malicious attacks are studied
in Section V. In Section VI, the proposed model is tested with
numerical simulations, and finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section VII.
II. MALICIOUS VERSUS NATURAL THREATS
A threat is the danger of adversarial events, such as malicious
attacks. Attacks may impair systems security by acting upon
some existing vulnerabilities or faults. Malicious attacks are
conducted with criminal, belligerent, or political purposes. De-
fense measures for diminishing the probability of such attacks
may be either online or offline. The former ones consist of coun-
termeasures taken before the happening of the contingency,
including responses to threat warnings; the latter are performed
after the contingency. From this point of view, this paper centers
on the analysis of the vulnerability of infrastructure and the
effectiveness of defense measures.
A. Natural Hazards, Systemic Failures, and Human Errors
Natural hazards happen due to acts of nature and, there-
fore, occur without the intentional intervention of any human
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being. Natural phenomena, such as atmospheric discharges
(lightning), animals, winds, etc., may impact on infrastructures’
integrity and their operation and are typically analyzed by
means of statistical method. Systemic failures come about due
to the activation of faults in components, following stochastic
reliability laws. They are subject to the lifecycle of the system:
operation, maintenance and repair, aging, production, and so
on. System failures follow some physical laws that can be
discovered by statistical and experimental methods, extensively
developed in the field of reliability engineering. Failures caused
by human action, although without intention, are normally
known as human errors, since there is no willingness. The three
of these phenomena (i.e., natural hazards, systemic failures, and
human errors) are characterized by a key common element:
They may cause system failures on a random basis, independent
on the intention of any human being.
B. Malicious Threats
Malicious attacks are brought about by human beings with
the willingness to provoke damage. They are critical for the
infrastructures’ security. The resulting damage can be evaluated
in various respects, e.g., operational, financial, psychological,
etc. Some features of malicious threats are as follows.
1) Malicious threats are potential hazards that can material-
ize as attacks—i.e., threats cause damage, when executed
as offensive actions.
2) Attacks are the actual implementation of threats, and
therefore, they are the effective cause of damages.
3) Malicious threats are selective: The more the target can
produce disruptive effects, the more it is likely to be
attacked; the more the target is protected, the less likely it
will be attacked.
4) Attacks are carried through as processes, where actions of
the attackers and defenders follow and affect each other.
In other words, an attack is a chain of mutually dependent
offensive and defensive events. In few occasions, the
hostile part of an attack can consist of just one step, but
more generally, it will comprehend several steps, possibly
organized in successive phases.
The level of threat, for a given component, depends on
the attitudes, decisions, and interaction between attackers and
defenders at a given point in time and space.
Therefore, the study of malicious threats must take into ac-
count the interactions between attackers and defenders. We pro-
pose in this paper to approach this problem using game theory.
C. Comparison Between Accidental and Malicious Threats
As pointed out, there are huge distinctions in various re-
spects between malicious threats and accidental ones. Conven-
tional risk-analysis methods for dealing with accidental failures
provide limited answer to malicious ones. When considering
deliberate attacks, strategic interaction between the actors de-
termines the probability of an attack (in time and in space, i.e.,
which element will be targeted), while accidental acts occur on
a random basis. This is based on the assumption that malicious
actors are rational agents and, hence, will thoroughly scrutinize
the cost and potential effects of their acts. Their analyses will
include the means and ways, the target, and the time of the
attack. For instance, malicious attackers are likely to select the
target that appears assailable for their available resources and
with more potential impact. Obviously, both the difficulty of the
attack and its effects are dependent upon the defender’s counter-
measures. Therefore, the decision of the malicious attacker will
vary according to the corresponding decisions of the defender.
In other words, strategic interaction between attackers and
defenders affects the probability distribution of the contingency.
Attackers will adapt their goals, tactics, resources, timing, and
modes of operation according to the (perceived) actions of the
defenders.
Conventional methods for analyzing accidental failures, like
probabilistic approaches and Monte Carlo simulation, are not
always suitable for malicious attacks, particularly when the
chain of events during an attack expands in complex series
of actions and counteractions, with the attackers dynamically
adapting to the new conditions defined by the technical and or-
ganizational measures of the defenders. In addition, there is lit-
tle statistical information of aggressive actions that could serve
as probabilistic basis for typical risk-assessment processes.
Traditional risk-assessment approaches can not provide an
answer to situation characterized by the changing nature of
the capabilities and strategic goals of the attackers and their
evaluation of the attractiveness of the targets.
Another distinctive difference among malicious and acciden-
tal threats is that, by taking some special preemptive measures,
for instance, systems hardening by vulnerabilities elimination,
system operators are able to substantially diminish the proba-
bility of success of malicious attacks. To be noticed, the model
of the strategic interaction depends on the specific reference
scenario. For example, if defenders’ online countermeasures
can be neglected and information is perfect, terrorists face a
certain scenario and choose the target that could have the ma-
jor effect. Nevertheless, conventional probabilistic approaches
could provide some contribution to the analysis of malicious
threats. For instance, if the attacker knows little about the
defender’s countermeasure, the choice of the target will be
based on history or experience about which one could greatly
disturb the system. If one hypothesizes an attack with few steps,
the interactions between attacker and defender are limited, and
therefore, one can apply probabilistic approaches.
Table I introduces a side-by-side comparison between the
two types of threats. In particular, we want to point out that
the societal actors that will suffer the consequences of natural
threats (the “sufferers” mentioned in the table) are different
from the “other affected actors” related to malicious threats,
since the former are randomly affected (i.e., nature has no
specific aim) and are basically passive targets, while the latter
refers to those influenced by the malicious threat, who are not
necessarily the first targets of an attack.
III. STRATEGIC INTERACTION MODEL
The rational player hypothesis, according to which each
player will act so as to maximize a measure of his/her own
utility, is assumed.
As discussed in Section III, defenders take countermeasures
against malicious attacks against power systems. In this paper,
we consider that the system may be strengthened by offline
countermeasures in case there is warning of malicious threats.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN NATURAL AND MALICIOUS THREATS
Our aim is to compute the risk of the power system in terms
of the resources and the action sets available to the defender
and attacker. The action selected by one side will surely
influence the action of the other side. Obviously, malicious
threats shall be directed against the more critical and vulnerable
components; hence, these attacker targets shall be the subjects
of the defenders’ highest attention; on the contrary, the less
critical and vulnerable components are also less likely to be
attacked. Therefore, there is a complex interaction between
decisions on both sides. The concept of “equilibrium” can be
used to represent the game outcome. A Nash equilibrium is a
set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has
the incentive to unilaterally change his/her action. Players are
in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them
would lead that player to have less utility than if he/she keeps
the current strategy. Therefore, the equilibrium is the foreseen
outcome of the game with a given set of conditions and may be
an important reference for the players to make their decisions.
The defender and the attacker are both rational entities
and will analyze the situation to find their optimal actions.
When these actions are the best choices of rational agents
with respect to a given set of conditions, the result is the
state of equilibrium. Considering the specific features of power
systems, the next sections present a game model to represent
the interaction between malicious attackers and defenders when
attacking/defending the network.
A. Game Representation of the Malicious Attack
In a malicious attack, the roles and the corresponding action
sets are defined as follows.
1) Players:
Attacker) All malicious actors that want to attack power-
system components to maximize the damage.
Defender) Various entities (e.g., system operators, authori-
ties) whose goal is to minimize the power-system
vulnerability and the potential damage caused by
malicious attacks.
2) Action Set: The scenario considered includes the possi-
bility of simultaneous attack actions (and the corresponding
defense ones) against several components of the target systems.
This relates to the fact that, in power systems, the occurrence of
a simultaneous failure is usually much more severe. Moreover,
simultaneous occurrence of multiple natural failures is usually
with much lower probability, which makes “n− 1” criterion
widely adopted to assure the system feasibility and operability
after the occurrence of any major single failure. However, this
condition does not apply to the malicious attack.
Attacker’s action set: The attack action is a plan that aims
at several components as the attacking targets. The candidate
components are considered to be either lines or buses.
Line attacked) The line (or parallel lines) attacked remain
inoperative with a certain successful destruc-
tion rate (i.e., the lines are open from the
electrical viewpoint).
Bus attacked) All lines, generation, and load connected to
the bus are disconnected with a certain suc-
cessful destruction rate.
Defender’s action set of defender: The defense action is a
plan that defines the components to be protected. Two types of
defense actions are considered, with different time frames.
1) Online defense action, which can be deployed at once.
For instance, more strict inspection and security control
or patrols guarding specific components. This follows the
response to malicious threats defined by NERC [3], [4].
The effect of this defense actions is the lowering of the
destruction rate of the specific components attacked.
2) Offline defense action with a time delay, which refers to
general actions that enhance the protection of the entire
electric network. For instance, construction of new lines
or new buses—all measures that may require a long time
to be implemented. As a result, the topology of the net-
work will change, together with the power-flow patterns.
3) Payoff: The payoff functions of the malicious attackers
and of the defenders will be different, as their goals and percep-
tion of potential benefits have opposing views. For this reason,
our model makes use of the same bilevel approach introduced in
[11] that allows this parallel modeling of the objective functions
for the attacker and the defender. However, it is still reasonable
to model the interaction as a zero-sum game, since the utilities
of the two sides are complementary, namely, the loss of one side
is the gain of the other side. The utility of the attacker and the
defender can be formulated as
Attacker : SA =CD + C − CA (1)
Defender : SD =CA − CD − C (2)
where
SA the payoff of the attacker;
SD the payoff of the defender;
CA the attacker’s cost of its attacking;
CD the defender’s cost of its defending measures;
C the monetary measure of the damage incurred by the
attack action.
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Usually, the damage is much bigger than the defense/attack
cost; hence, the latter can be omitted.
The damage to the systems due to an attack can be quantified
in terms of the economic value of the lost load that, for a generic
bus 2m, can be determined as
Gm = λmΔLm. (3)
Gm and ΔLm are, respectively, the value of the damage and
the load shedding at the bus m, while λm is an evaluation factor
that expresses the importance of the loads connected at the bus.
Buses with different levels of importance can be represented
by imposing various values of λm, which not only considers
the economic aspect of the load loss at that bus but also the
potential social, political, environmental, or even psychological
impact on the end users and other affected stakeholders. For
sake of simplicity, we adopt the simple damage expression
shown in (3), which is based on a per-load-interrupted basis. In
fact, the economic impact is not the crucial factor for malicious
attackers. Terrorists aim to create fear in the public so as to exert
pressure on the government and eventually attain their political
goals in an indirect way. Although comprehensive modeling of
malicious attacks is undoubtedly necessary, in this paper, we
focus on modeling the strategic interactions between attackers
and defenders only, taking into account the economic value of
the damage for sake of simplicity.
Cascading failures play a very important role in spreading
the effect of an initial power-system fault, power-system dy-
namic characteristics, stability, and relay protections interplay
to limit/spread such failures. In this paper, cascading outages
are not considered so as to simplify the analysis. Consequences
are evaluated with a simple dc model. Defenders, after a suc-
cessful attack, will try to minimize the economic value of the
lost load to keep the system feasible. This is similar to what
people do in traditional power-system adequacy evaluation.
When an attack successfully destroys the components con-
tained in the setX , the defender has to face the contingency, and
the system restoration can be decided by solving the following
optimization problem:
minMX =
∑
m∈Θ
Gm (4)
s.t.
Fl ≤Flmax , l ∈ Φ (5)
0 ≤ΔLm ≤ Lm, m ∈ Θ (6)
0 ≤Pm + ΔPm ≤ Pmmax , m ∈ Θ (7)
where MX is the total economic value of the lost load due
to the destruction of the components contained in the set X .
Pm, ΔPm, and Pmmax are, respectively, the generated power
before the contingency, the variation of the generated power,
and the maximum generated power at bus m. Fl and Flmax are,
respectively, the power flow and the maximum power flow on
line l. Lm is the load demand at bus m before the contingency
occurrence. Θ and Φ are the sets of the buses and of the lines of
the system, respectively.
Transmission constraints are respected with (5), in which
power flows are determined by the nodal net-power injection
and the line impedance, only considering the dc power-flow
model. Therefore, binding of the constraint (5) means that the
nodal power is adjusted, which may possibly result in a nonzero
TABLE II
ENUMERATION OF ATTACK PLANS WITH nA COMPONENTS CONSIDERED
value of ΔLm, so as to impact the value of Gm as well as the
objective function Mx according to the formula (3) and (4).
Moreover, the restoration time, which will surely impact the
consequence, can be considered in (3) but needs much more
complicated modeling. Since the purpose of this paper is just
to introduce strategic interaction in risk evaluation, we do not
further investigate this point in-depth.
The set of system components is R. The attack plan may
target several power-system components simultaneously, and
the components that are candidate for the attack may be, in the
most general case, a subsystem ofR. If we assume that there are
nA components candidate for the attack and that an attack plan
can contain any number of components between 1 and nA, the
possible attack plans can be enumerated as in Table II. Under
those assumptions, the total number of the attack plans can be
determined and equals 2nA − 1.
Analogously, on the defender’s side, the defense plan con-
tains the components for which some defense measures have
been taken and, in the most general case, is a subsystem of R.
If we assume that there are nD candidate components to be
defended and that a defense plan can contain any number of
components between 1 and nD, the possible defense plans can
be similarly enumerated, and the total number of the defense
plans equals 2nD − 1.
All the possible scenarios determined by the combination of
a defense plan and an attack plan should be examined to account
for the security situation in light of possible malicious activities.
The action set, which is composed of the plans of both
the attacker and the defender, is confined by their respective
resources. Since it is reasonable to assume limited resources
for implementing attack and defense plans, some constraints re-
lated to the available resources of the attacker and the defender
can be included.
If the attacker realizes the ith attack plan, referred to as Ai,
the cost of implementation CAi
CAi =
∑
k∈Ai
Coak (8)
should meet the resource constraint
CAi ≤ BA. (9)
BOMPARD et al.: RISK ASSESSMENT OF MALICIOUS ATTACKS AGAINST POWER SYSTEMS 1079
Analogously, if the defender implements the jth defense
plan, referred to as Dj , the cost of implementation CDj
CDj =
∑
k∈Dj
Codk (10)
should meet the resource constraint
CDj ≤ BD. (11)
In (8) and (9), Coak and Codk are the costs representing
attack and defense resources with respect to the component k,
respectively; in (10) and (11), BA and BD are the budgets
representing resources of the corresponding attackers and de-
fenders. Changing the system operational state could be also
an effective countermeasure for the defender, but in this paper,
we only study the online hardening action with respect to the
specific components of the system under analysis.
As a consequence of the resource constraints, not all the
possible enumerated plans can be realized, and the number of
feasible attack and defense plans, referred to as NA and ND, are
NA ≤ (2nA − 1) (12)
ND ≤ (2nD − 1). (13)
Obviously, with the variation of the resource, the action-set
sizes of the defender and attacker will change as well as the
final game results. Therefore, the sensitivity of the risk to the
defender’s/attacker’s resource allocation can be quantified, and
the optimal defense resource allocation can be obtained.
A scenario is defined as the set composed of the attack plan
chosen by the attacker and the defense plan chosen by the de-
fender. Therefore, there are NA ×ND feasible scenarios with
respect to the various attack and defense plans to be analyzed.
Let us consider a scenario in which the attacker implements
the attack plan Ai and the defender chooses the defense plan
Dj . We assume that, once the component k ∈ Ai is attacked,
it has a probability αk to be successfully implemented if no
protection measures have been taken by the defender for that
component, i.e., when k /∈ Dj . It has the probability βk to be
successfully implemented with the corresponding protection
measures taken by the defender; in other words, if the com-
ponent k ∈ Dj .
Considering that each component in the set Ai has a proba-
bility to be successfully destroyed, the damage evaluation of the
attack in terms of the economic loss of load Cij should take into
account all the possible cases and, therefore, is expressed as
Cij =
∑
∀G1∪G2=Ai
∀H1∪H2=Dj
[ ∏
k∈G1
αk ·
∏
k∈G2
(1− αk) ·
∏
k∈H1
βk
·
∏
k∈H2
(1− βk) ·MG1∪H1
]
(14)
where
G1 the set of components that have not been defended and
are destroyed;
G2 the set of components that have not been defended and
are not destroyed;
TABLE III
ENUMERATION OF POSSIBLE EVENTS WITH REFERENCE
TO THE COMPONENT STATE AFTER THE ATTACK
H1 the set of components that have been defended but are
destroyed;
H2 the set of components that have been defended and are
not destroyed.
To illustrate the calculation of Cij , let Ai contain the com-
ponents 1, 2, and 3 and Dj contain the components 1 and 3.
The possible events that could occur in relation to the state of
the components after the attack are mutually exclusive, and they
are listed in Table III. The value of Cij can be derived by adding
up the products of the probability of each event (please see the
last column in Table III) and the consequent economic damage.
The analysis considers a worst-case scenario: i.e., the de-
struction of the components. Although the pure tripping of the
component might cause important consequences (even a black-
out), their complete destruction will result in more difficulty
for recovering the system and, hence, causes more significant
losses/impact. Thorough investigations need to be made for
studying the effects of attacks onto complex power systems.
In this paper, the extent of the successful attack is expressed
by assigning to it a probability, but the difference between
tripping and destroying components is not highlighted. Since
this paper’s focus is on the strategic interactions in malicious
attack, the modeling of the attack effects is simplified.
B. Framework of the Game Evolution
The evolution of power-system configurations with respect
to the risk of blackouts from nonterrorist cascading failures
is introduced in [24]. In this paper, the system vulnerability
and the associated risk analysis are carried out in terms of the
equilibrium of the game between the defender and the attacker.
With the variation of the system configuration/topology, and
the resources of the defender and the attacker, the equilibrium
changes accordingly—hence, the risk assessment should be
performed repetitively at successive moments, as shown in
Fig. 1. For each variation of the situation of the power system,
the defender, and the attacker, a new game is established with a
new equilibrium. For example, at time point ti, the defender’s
decision of online defense action takes effect at once, therefore,
will participate in the game at ti, while the defender’s decision
of the defense action with time delay changes the system
topology at tj ; hence, it will influence the equilibrium at tj .
C. Equilibrium of the Game
We propose to consider an MSE, in which, at the equilibrium
(theoretically, it always exists), a probability is given to each
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Fig. 1. Risk analysis based on game model along the time axis.
action in the action set. The equilibrium may not be unique—in
some cases, in fact, multiple equilibria can arise from the game.
Considering mixed strategies, the expected payoff of the players
can be evaluated, and the probabilities assigned to the actions
are derived. Therefore, it is possible to evaluate the risk with
reference to the associated utility of the defender. Searching the
equilibrium is always a difficult problem, since it is computa-
tionally expensive, particularly with a large action set. Proper
algorithms need to be developed to handle real-case problems.
The traditional enumeration approach is applied to solve
the game treated in this paper. It is an indirect way to search
the equilibrium, which derives from the nature of the MSE.
Namely, at equilibrium, the probability assignment to the
defender’s/attacker’s actions should make uniform the utilities
of the attacker’s/defender’s nonzero-probability actions. More-
over, the utility of the nonzero-probability actions should be
greater than that of the zero-probability actions. According to
this property, an enumeration approach is recommended in [25],
where, with different cases of the zero-probability distribution,
a set of the linear equations can be listed and solved for
limited action sets. If the action set is not big, the approach
is very direct and efficient and it is widely used to demonstrate
solutions of MSE problems. However, the computation will be
exponentially increased with the action-set expansion. Usually,
the evolutionary computation will be resorted for big action set
[26], [27], but global optimum is not assured.
We propose an alternative approach based on optimization,
in which the uniform utilities property can be transformed to
minimize the difference among the utilities.
Let us suppose that pAi and pDj are, respectively, the proba-
bilities of choosing the ith attack plan Ai and the jth defense
plan Dj . Starting from the evaluation of the attack in terms of
the economic loss of load, i.e., Cij , the expected costs/losses of
the system is determined as
Eij = pAi p
D
j Cij . (15)
The expected utility of the attacker corresponding to the ith
plan SAi is
SAi = p
A
i Ai (16)
where
Ai = −CAi +
ND∑
j=1
pDj
(
Cij + CDj
)
. (17)
The expected utility of the defender corresponding to the jth
defense plan SDj is
SDj = p
D
j Dj (18)
where
Dj = −CDj +
NA∑
i=1
pAi
(
Cij + CAi
)
. (19)
Therefore, the utility of the attacker SA and of the defender
SD are given by
SA =
NA∑
i=1
SAi (20)
SD =
ND∑
j=1
SDj . (21)
The problem of the search of the MSE can be therefore
formulated, as explained in the following. For the attacker, the
search of MSE can be found by solving
pAk
(
NA∑
i=1
pAi Ai −Ak
)
=0 (k = 1, . . . , NA) (22a)
NA∑
i=1
pAi Ai −Ak ≥ 0 (k = 1, . . . , NA) (22b)
0 ≤ pAi ≤ 1 (i = 1, . . . , NA) (22c)
NA∑
i=1
pAi =1 (22d)
where the rules for determining the equilibrium can be ex-
plained as follows.
1) Since the actions with nonzero probabilities have a uni-
form utility and
∑NA
i=1 p
A
i = 1, therefore, if pAk = 0, then∑NA
i=1 p
A
i Ai = Ak, and this makes the (22a) true.
2) Since the utility of the nonzero-probability actions
is greater than that of the zero-probability actions
and
∑NA
i=1 p
A
i Ai is equal to the utility of any
nonzero-probability action, therefore, if pAk = 0, then∑NA
i=1 p
A
i Ai > Ak.
3) Considering both 1) and 2), (22b) is proved.
Analogously, for the defender, the following equations
should be satisfied:
pDk
⎛
⎝ND∑
j=1
pDj Dj −Dk
⎞
⎠ =0, k = 1, . . . , ND (23a)
ND∑
i=1
pDi Di −Dj ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , ND (23b)
0 ≤ pDi ≤ 1, k = 1, . . . , ND (23c)
ND∑
i=1
pDi =1. (23d)
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In (22) and (23), the variables are the probabilities of the
attacker’s actions pAk (k = 1, . . . , NA) and of the defender’s
actions pDk (k = 1, . . . , ND).
Solving jointly (22) and (23), the MSE is identified. An
effective way to approach the solution point is to transform (22)
and (23) into an optimization problem as
min
⎧⎨
⎩
⎡
⎣NA∑
k=1
pAk
(
NA∑
i=1
pAi Ai −Ak
)2⎤⎦
+
⎡
⎣ND∑
k=1
pDk
(
ND∑
i=1
pDi Di −Dk
)2⎤⎦
⎫⎬
⎭ (24a)
s.t.
NA∑
i=1
pAi Ai −Ak ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , NA (24b)
0 ≤ pAi ≤ 1,
NA∑
i=1
pAi = 1 (24c)
ND∑
i=1
pDi Di −Dk ≥ 0 (k = 1, . . . , ND) (24d)
0 ≤ pDi ≤ 1,
ND∑
i=1
pDi = 1. (24e)
The optimization problem (24) is a constrained quadratic opti-
mization problem and can be conveniently solved. The objec-
tive function (24a) is the sum of NA + ND quadratic terms,
and so to minimize (24a) is to actually minimize the NA + ND
quadratic terms, the minimum of (24a) should be zero, and it
is acquired at the equilibrium, where (22) and (23) are both
respected. Moreover, since every term of (24a) can be zero,
to minimize (24a) is to minimize the difference among the
utilities of the nonzero-probability actions. The equilibrium is
found when the objective function (24a) is zero, which can be
taken as true in practice when the objective function is below a
threshold.
IV. RISK ASSESSMENT OF MALICIOUS THREATS
With the actions set and the corresponding utilities com-
puted, the game can be solved by the approaches provided in
the previous section, and the MSE can be obtained as well as
the probabilities of the various plans. The risk is defined as the
product of the probability and the corresponding damages,
which can be taken as the utility of the attacker. Namely, the
risk can be expressed as
γ =
NA∑
i=1
pAi · SAi (25)
which is also the expected payoff of the attacker. According
to [25, Lemma 364.1] which states that “the expected payoff
of each player in any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of
a strategic game is at least equal to his/her maxminimized
payoff,” we propose a more general model of that in [10], which
can be considered as a special case of our model.
It should be noticed that, in our MSE model, probabilities
are assigned to the actions, and each action may contain several
components. The probability of being attacked/defended prob-
Fig. 2. IEEE RTS 96 24-bus system.
ability of a specific component is the sum of the probabilities of
the attack/defense actions that contain the component.
The probability of the kth component to be attacked is
poak =
NA∑
i=1
if{k}⊆Ai
pAi . (26)
Therefore, the vulnerability of the system can be assessed
with respect to the ranking of system components regarding
their probability of being attacked.
The probability of the kth component to be defended is
podk =
ND∑
j=1
if{k}⊆Dj
pDj . (27)
The defense probability of each component at the equilib-
rium, which is the outcome of the game, is also obtained. At
the equilibrium, once the defender keeps its strategy, no matter
which decision the attacker takes, the expected consequence
will not be altered. Namely, if the defender follows the strategy
defined at the equilibrium, there is a corresponding fixed risk.
Adopting the defense strategy at the equilibrium, the risk can
be controlled below the risk at equilibrium. Therefore, on the
one hand, the risk evaluation establishes a link between the
resources (budgets) and the risk so as to set a reference for
budget allocation; on the other hand, it provides an effective
strategy to control the risk.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
To illustrate the application of our model to the security
assessment of malicious threats to, the IEEE RTS 96 System
[28] is taken as the test system.
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TABLE IV
BUDGET AND THE ACTION COST IN BASE CASE∗
The IEEE RTS 96 24-bus system is composed of 24 buses,
38 lines, and 32 generators (Fig. 2). The load profile is defined
as that of the winter weekday at 1800 [28].
The base case of the attack and defense budgets and costs of
a single line or a single bus is shown in Table IV. The successful
destruction rate with/without protection (online defense action)
of the power-system components are, respectively, βk = 0.2
and αk = 0.8. For the unserved energy, we take the direct cost
of $0.66/kWh and the indirect cost $3.45/kWh [2], and the
average recovery time of the failure is 72 h [10]; therefore
the cost-shedding evaluation factor is assumed as lm = (0.66 +
3.45) $/kWh · 72 h = 0.296 $/W.
The objectives are to determine the vulnerability of the
system, assess the risk sensitivity to the resources of the attacker
and the defender, and obtain the optimal resource allocation
for the defender. The defense actions refer only to the online
defense action, since the impacts of the action with a time delay
can be considered as changes in the system topology.
In the following points, we present the simulation in three
steps. First, we test the proposed approach with respect to the
computational burden, in order to justify the performance of
the algorithm. Second, the risk assessment of the base case of
the test system is carried out; the risk sensitivity and the sen-
sitivity analysis of the probabilities of being attacked/defended
with reference to the variation of the destruction rate βi, and the
defense and attack resource are presented.
A. Algorithm Testing
To carry out the risk analysis, the MSE should be efficiently
found. We tested the approaches proposed in Section IV for
solving the MSE as shown in Table V, where “−” means the
approach cannot get convergence or cannot find the equilibrium
in half an hour. The efficiency of the traditional approach, which
is detailed in Section IV-C, rapidly goes down with the increase
of the action set size. It takes more 2325 s with the set size 15 for
the traditional approach but only 0.328 s for the approach pro-
posed. The efficiency of the algorithm is acceptable (840.7 s for
the set with 232 actions). Moreover, the optimization algorithm
presents good performance with respect to its accuracy, which
is assured by the value of the objective function approaching
to zero (in Table V, the maximum objective function value is
1.09× 10−6). Therefore, the optimization approach is selected
as the MSE algorithm for the following steps of the analysis.
Even when considering resource constraints, the sizes of
the action sets are usually huge with middle-scale systems.
When studying the probabilities of MSE, we find that they are
unevenly distributed, and the nonzero probabilities are always
assigned to a few actions. Therefore, for the sake of simplifica-
TABLE V
MSE APPROACHES TEST WITH ACTION SETS OF DIFFERENT SIZES
tion, we reduce the size of the action set by only considering
a certain number of possible actions. For example, 50 attack
actions (i) with the largest
∑
j Cij are considered, and 50
defense actions (j) with the largest
∑
i Cij are considered.
B. Risk Assessment and Sensitivity Analysis
With the given power-system configuration and the data of
the defender and attacker, the MSE of the game is solved. Being
the foreseen result of the game, the MSE provides a way to
assess the power-system vulnerability and the associated risk in
terms of the stable situation at the equilibrium. At equilibrium,
the defense/attack plans with nonzero probabilities and the
risks are shown in Table VI, which is obtained by solving
the optimization problem (24). The vulnerability of the system
can be represented by the probability of the components to be
attacked and defended as shown in Table VII. The equilibrium
is a steady state where the attacker chooses the buses 8, 13,
15, and 18 and lines 15–21 and 16–17 as the target of the
offensive actions, and the defender chooses to defend buses 8,
13, 15, and 18 and line 15–21 with the probabilities given in
Table VII. For each attack action in Table VI, the expected
payoff of the attacker is $60 560 and that of the defender is
−$60 560, since it is modeled as a zero-sum game. Namely, at
this state, neither the attacker nor the defender will unilaterally
change their decision.
1) Variation of the Destruction Rate βk (βk ≤ αk): From
the technical point of view, the lower the βk, the better the
corresponding component is protected. The risk variation with
the decrease of βk is shown in Fig. 3. βk = 0.8 and βk = 0
are two extreme cases; the former one means that the defense
measures cannot make any difference with regard to the attacks,
and the latter one means that the defended component will
definitely not be destroyed. In Fig. 3, we find that the decrease
of βk is an effective way of decreasing the risk; the risk decrease
rate is diminishing with the diminution of βk, which implies
that if βk is high, it is more effective to lower βk. For instance,
if βk decreases from 0.8 to 0.7, the risk decreases of $14 370,
but the corresponding risk reduction is only $2736 when βk
decrease from 0.1 to 0. Moreover, even with βk = 0 there is an
obvious bottleneck of the minimum risk $54 718.
Fig. 4 shows the evolution of all the nonzero-attack proba-
bilities of the components. When the defense measures have
no effect (i.e., βk = 0.8), the attacking pattern is definite with
the targets line 15–21 and line 16–17. With the decrease of
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TABLE VI
MSE OF THE GAME WITH REFERENCE TO THE IEEE RTS 96 SYSTEM
TABLE VII
BEING ATTACKED AND DEFENDED PROBABILITIES OF THE COMPONENTS AT THE MSE
Fig. 3. Risk sensitivity to the variation of the destroy rate βk .
Fig. 4. Being-attacked probabilities of the components with the variation
of βk .
βk, the targeting becomes dispersed; when βk = 0, the attacked
probabilities of the components are very similar.
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the nonzero probabilities for all
the defended components. When the defense measures have no
effect (βk = 0.8), the defender would choose to implement no
defense. With the decrease of βk, there will be more and more
components to be defended, and it is interesting to find that the
components seem to have various relative priorities with respect
to the probabilities for being defended. This phenomenon is
more distinctive for the buses, for instance, bus 18 always keeps
its advantage of podk over the other buses.
2) Variation of the Defense Resources: The defense re-
sources are a key contributor to the risk variation. Fig. 6 shows
the risk sensitivity with respect to the variation of the defense
resource BD. With the increase of BD, the risk diminishes ac-
cordingly. Once BD is just over the threshold of defending two
lines (i.e., 60, as defending one line is meaningless, since the
“n− 1” principle should be kept), the risk is greatly reduced.
Fig. 5. Being-defended probabilities of the components with the variation
of βk .
Fig. 6. Risk sensitivity to the variation of the defense resource BD .
But with the continuous increase of the defense resources, the
reduction rate of the risk will be gradually decreased. This
fact provides a basis for the optimal allocation of the defense
resources. Compared with Fig. 3, there must be a tradeoff be-
tween the limited available resources and the resources devoted
to the single components. At a certain level of βi, to allocate the
limited resources to defend more components might be more
effective for decreasing the risks.
The evolution of the probabilities of being attacked as func-
tion of the increase of the BD is shown in Fig. 7. It is quite
similar to Fig. 4: When BD is under a threshold, the defense
is not effective, and the targeted components will be definitely
attacked. With the increase of BD, more and more components
are targeted with various probabilities, namely, the increase of
BD will disperse the probability of being attacked among the
various components.
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Fig. 7. Being-attacked probabilities of the components with the increase of
the defense resources BD .
Fig. 8. Being-defended probabilities of the components with the increase of
the defense resources BD .
Fig. 9. Risk sensitivity to the variation of the resource of the defender and the
attacker.
The evolution of the probabilities of being defended as a
function of BD is shown in Fig. 8. In the beginning, there are
no enough resources to implement the defense action, while
with the increase of the defense resources, the probabilities of
being defended have an obvious increasing tendency, and some
components gain more probability of being defended.
3) Risk Sensitivity to the Defense/Attack Resources: Fig. 9
shows the risk variation with respect to the various resources of
the defender and attacker.
The increase of the attack resources increases the impact of
the attack, rapidly showing the effect of the infrastructure as
a consequence amplifier. On the contrary, to curb the attack
effects, the increase of the defense budget is much less effective.
In other words, the risk of the attacker is very sensitive to the
budget of the attacker, but much less sensitive to the budget of
the defender. With reference to the objective of diminishing the
risk, this quantitative analysis allows the understanding of how
effective is the increase of the defense resources as well as how
effective it would be to control the resources of the attacker.
VI. CONCLUSION
The specificity of malicious attacks lies in the interaction
between entities with conflicting interests and cannot be fully
studied with traditional approaches suitable for natural threats
(as, for instance, probabilistic risk analysis).
Game theory provides a sound approach to model strategic
interaction between defenders and attackers in the context of
malicious attacks. This paper shows how useful analytical tools,
based on the hypothesis of MSE, can be implemented for
those strategic interaction models and used to study different
attack–defense scenarios. A key point is that, for finding the
MSE, we developed an efficient optimization algorithm, which
accounts for the model application to a real-size system. Partic-
ularly, our approach supports the assessment of the likelihood
of attacks to different components of power systems, for then
ranking those components in terms of the associated risk. This
kind of analysis can be exploited for designing proper defense
plans and for allocating scarce resources to the most convenient
defense actions in protecting the most sensitive targets.
As an example of the possibilities provided by the approach
and the tool, the analysis undertaken for the simple test sys-
tem brings preliminary conclusions. The risk sensitivity of the
resources, in terms of the amount of resources and budget
allocated to pursue their targets, is much higher for the attacker
than for the defender, showing the amplifying effect of the
network structure of power systems with respect to action of the
attackers. Defense measures to strengthen the power systems
have the effect of causing the dispersion of the offensive actions
deployed by the attacker.
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